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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that cyclical and chaotic planning solutions are possible in the standard
“textbook model” of search and matching in labor markets. More speciﬁcally, it takes a discrete-
time adaptation of the continuous-time matching economy described in Pissarides (1990, 2001), and
computes the solution to the dynamic planning problem. The solution is shown to be completely
characterized by a ﬁrst-order, non-linear map with a unique stationary solution. Additionally, the
e x i s t e n c eo fal a r g en u m b e ro fp e r i o d i ca n de v e naperiodic non-stationary solutions is shown. Even
when the well-known Li-Yorke and three-period cycle conditions for chaos are violated, we are able
to verify the new Mitra (2001) suﬃcient condition for topological chaos. The implication is that even
in a simple economy characterized by search and matching frictions, an omniscient social planner
may have to contend with a fairly robust and “bewildering” variety of possible dynamic paths.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J64
Keywords: search, chaos, cycles
∗The idea for this paper was stimulated by discussions with Rob Reed. We acknowledge, without implicating, extremely
helpful feedback from the editor, Cars Hommes, two anonymous referees, Tapan Mitra, Dale Mortensen, Robert Shimer,
and Jan Van Ours.
†Please address all correspondence (until June 15, 2003) to: Helle Bunzel, CentER, Oﬃce # B435, Tilburg University,
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: hbunzel@iastate.edu; Ph: +31 13 466 3046; fax: +31 13 466
3066.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper takes the planning solution to the standard “textbook model” of search and matching in labor
markets, and shows that chaotic behavior is possible in that framework. More speciﬁcally, it takes as a
starting point, Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (2000; Chapter 19) discrete-time adaptation of the continuous-
time matching economy described in Pissarides (1990, 2001) and computes the solution to the dynamic
planning problem. The solution is completely characterized by a ﬁrst-order, non-linear scalar diﬀerence
equation. There is a unique stationary solution as was shown by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). The
main contribution of this paper is to show that, additionally, there are a large number of periodic and
even aperiodic dynamical solutions that may exist.
The implication is strong and clear: in an economy characterized by search and matching frictions,
even an omniscient social planner may have to contend with a “bewildering” (in the prose of Azariadis,
1993) variety of possible dynamic solutions. In a sense, this result is reminiscent of the characterization
of chaotic planning solutions to the Ramsey growth model as enunciated in Boldrin and Montruchhio
(1986), and more recently in Mitra, Majumdar, and Nishimura (2000), and further exposited in Mitra
and Nishimura (2001).1 There is however one main diﬀerence. In the standard aggregative optimal
growth model, the decentralized equilibrium is eﬃcient; in the Pissarides model, the decentralized
equilibrium is generically not optimal.
Several papers in the literature have investigated the possibility of endogenous cycles in search models
of the labor market. The seminal papers in this area are Drazen (1988) and Diamond and Fudenberg
(1989); both build on Diamond (1982) and prove the existence of stable limit cycles in a model where
there are frictions in coordinating trade, and the matching technology is subject to increasing returns.
More recently, Mortensen (1999) revisits the standard textbook model of search and matching in the
labor market as described in Pissarides (1990) but introduces an increasing returns to scale production
technology to generate multiple long-run unemployment equilibria and stable limit cycles.2 Shimer
and Smith (2001) explore optimal matching policies in constant returns to scale search economies with
heterogenous agents and ﬁnd the possibility of non-stationarity.
The current endeavour is diﬀerent from the previous literature in three important ways. First, the
focus here (as in Shimer and Smith, 2001) is on the planning solution as opposed to the “decentralized”
1Here, as in the exposition of Mitra and Nishimura (2001), periodic and aperiodic behavior is not an outcome of agents’
expectations about the actual realization of a certain random variable. For a insightful treatment of such a expectations-
driven model of cycles, see Hommes and Sorger (1998), and the discussion in Dechert and Hommes (2000).
2Mortensen (1999) assumes that match productivity is an increasing function of the aggregate number of matches. This
generates the needed increasing returns in production.
2solution (the focus of the other aforementioned papers). In fact, typically in these papers, the market
solution is representable by a system of diﬀerential equations, rather than a single ﬁrst-order non-linear
diﬀerence equation as is the case here. Second, neither the production nor the matching technologies
in our model exhibit any increasing returns. Finally, unlike the continuous-time framework used by
Mortensen (1999) and Shimer and Smith (2001), we use the discrete-time adaptation.3 In a sense, our
results suggest that merely delegating the job of coordinating labor market search activity to a planner
may not necessarily render an economy immune to endogenous ﬂuctuations; in fact, a planner may
introduce ﬂuctuations in an economy that was decentralized and otherwise possibly immune to cyclical
variations!
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the Pissarides (1990) model of
search and matching in labor markets. Section 3 contains a detailed analysis of the main diﬀerence
equation alluded to earlier. It establishes both analytically and through examples, that following either
the Li-Yorke route or the three-period cycles route, or the Mitra condition route, it is possible to
demonstrate the existence of topological chaos. Section 4 concludes. Proofs of some central results are
to be found in the appendices.
2 The Model
The model (and the notation) is based entirely on Ljungqvist and Sargent’s (2000) discrete-time adapta-
tion of the continuous-time matching economy described in Pissarides (1990, 2001). Let t =0 ,1,2,3,...
index time. There are two types of agents: workers and ﬁrms. There is a continuum of identical workers
of unit measure. These workers are all inﬁnitely-lived, they discount the future at the rate β, and are
risk-neutral. Workers potentially get matched with a ﬁrm; the result of such a match is output y.4 Each
ﬁr mm a ye m p l o ya tm o s to n ew o r k e r .Aﬁrm incurs a vacancy cost of c in each period when looking for
a worker. A match between a worker and a ﬁrm gets dissolved with an exogenously-speciﬁed probability
s. An unmatched worker is an unemployed worker; such a worker enjoys the current utility from leisure
of amount z.
Matches are brought together by a standard matching technology connecting only unemployed job
3The discrete-time version of the Pissarides (1990) search-and-matching story has also been employed by Merz (1995),
Andolfatto (1996), Shi and Quan (1999), Cooley and Quadrini (1999), Cole and Rogerson (1999), Yuan and Li (2000), and
Yashiv (2000), among others.
4In the decentralized equilibria, the match surplus is divided between the worker and the ﬁrm according to some
bargaining protocol. Below we assume that the planner cares only about the match output y, and not the division of the
match surplus.
3seekers with open vacancies. The number of successful matches in a period is given by M(ut,v t) where
ut is the total measure of unemployed workers looking for jobs, and vt is the number of vacancies or
ﬁrms looking for employees. The matching function is increasing in both arguments, concave, and
homogenous of degree one. Let θt ≡ vt/ut indicate the measure of labor market tightness, or the ratio
of vacancies to unemployed workers. Then deﬁne q(θt) ≡ M(ut,v t)/vt as the probability of a vacancy




t A>0,α ∈ (0,1) (1)
where A is a scale parameter. The parameter α is the elasticity of the matching function with respect
to the measure of unemployed workers. It follows that q(θ)=Aθ−α. Finally, deﬁne nt+1 as the total
number of employed workers at the start of t +1 . Then, it follows that







The number of undissolved matches (which were formed at the start of t that survived onto the start





·vt measures the number of new matches formed at t
between the unemployed workers (1 − nt), and the vacancies created at t.
A planner’s problem could then be outlined as follows. Assume that the planner chooses an allocation
that maximizes the discounted value of output and leisure net of vacancy costs. The principal tensions
are as follows. An extra vacancy adds a cost, makes it easier for unemployed workers to ﬁnd jobs,
but makes it harder for ﬁrms to ﬁnd workers. Employed workers “lose” leisure utility. More output
is produced if the extra vacancy creates more matches. The planner takes all this into account when
choosing the number of vacancies. Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000; p. 578), the planner chooses
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where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on (2). Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to vt and nt+1
f o ra ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o na r eg i v e nb y
−βtc + λt
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In Appendix A, we show that (3) and (4) reduce to the following ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation in θ :
aθα
t+1 − bθt+1 = θα
t − d (5)
where
a ≡ β (1 − s) ∈ (0,1), (6)
b ≡ Aαβ > 0, (7)
and
d ≡
A(1 − α)β (y − z)
c
> 0. (8)
Equation (5) is the law of motion for the index of labor market tightness in the economy under the





the ratio of per worker match output (net of lost leisure) to hiring and vacancy posting costs.
G i v e na ni n i t i a ln0, eq. (5) completely characterizes the trajectory of θ.5 In other words, the
backwards dynamics of this model can be characterized by the continuous four-parameter family of
maps g :[ 0 ,θmax] → [0,g max], where
g(θ)=( aθα − bθ + d)
1





1−α and gmax is implicitly deﬁned as the lowest positive root of the following equation:
agα
max − bgmax + d =0 .
The ﬁrst derivative of the map can be calculated as













α−1. Note however that
suﬃciently high values of α make it impossible for g0(.) to ever become negative, the latter being a
5Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000; p. 578) assume that the planner knows n0. From the ﬁrst order conditions to (P), it is
possible to compute v0. Since u0 =1−n0 is known, then θ0 becomes known. Using eq. (5), the optimal solution sequence
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∞
t=1 .
5necessary condition for the map g to exhibit any periodic behavior.6 In addition, g has a unique ﬁxed






1−α [1 − a + aα]. (10)
Henceforth we will maintain this as an assumption on the parameters.
The unique ﬁxed point of g is implicitly given by
aθα
ss − bθss = θα
ss − d.
The ﬁxed point is an attractor in the forward dynamics, if g0 (θss) < −1. Since it is not possible to obtain
a closed form expression for θss, this condition cannot be checked in general, but will have to be veriﬁed
for each set of parameters separately. As will be evident shortly, the fact that θss is implicitly deﬁned,
makes it a non-trivial problem to check the standard suﬃcient conditions for complex dynamics.
3 Cycles and Complex Dynamics
3.1 Two Period Cycles
Before proceeding to establish the possibility of chaotic behavior for the map g, we undertake a quick
study of the existence of two period cycles. This is useful because an analysis of the underlying economic
intuition driving any kind of periodic behavior is best undertaken via a study of two-period cycles. For
future reference, let us formally deﬁne a two-period cycle. Let (X,g) be a dynamical system where X
is a subset of < and let g2(m) denote the second iterate of the point m. A two-period cycle is a periodic
point m of order 2 if g2(m)=m (and m is such that g(m) 6= m). We now present a numerical example
of a two period cycle, and use it to discuss the economic intuition behind the ﬂuctuations in the various
variables.
Example 1 Suppose the set of parameters is given by 7 A α β s γ
2.40 0.348 0.99 0.0348 0.423
.T h e n ,
the map g admits a stationary solution, θss =0 .743, a n dat w op e r i o dc y c l ew i t hθ1 =0 .724 and
θ2 =0 .761.
6The condition, g
0 (θ) > 0 for all θ, is suﬃcient to rule out any kind of periodic behavior in our setup. See Azariadis
(1993; Chapter 8) for details. This condition may be thought of as the unidimensional, discrete-time analog, of Bendixson’s
criterion which is a suﬃcient condition to rule out cyclical behavior in two-dimensional continuous time systems. See Lorenz
(1993; Chapter 2) and Mortensen (1999).
7These correspond to a =0 .956,b=0 .827, and d =0 .654.
6The following set of ﬁgures (Figure 1) demonstrate the simultaneous movement of the central eco-
nomic variables in the two period cycle, compared with the steady state. Recall that the timing of the
model is such that, faced with the employment rate nt (or the unemployment rate ut =1− nt), the
planner selects how many vacancies vt to post. Since ut is already known, the number of vacancies
also directly determines the labor market tightness, θt and, together with the matching function, the
tightness determines the (un)employment rate next period.
Figure 1: The two-period cycle in Example 1
In the illustration of Example 1, the diﬀerence in the unemployment level between the high and the low
unemployment periods varies by about ﬁve percentage points. Since there is no variation in the size of
the working population, the movements in employment are exactly the opposite of the movements in
the unemployment rate. In periods with low unemployment, a low number of vacancies are posted, but
in spite of this, the overall labor market tightness is still above the level of labor market tightness in
high unemployment periods. This is driven by the low number of job seekers in the low unemployment
periods.
To understand the economic forces driving the two period cycle, recall that in periods when unem-
ployment is high, the marginal beneﬁt of posting a vacancy is high, because there are more unemployed
workers to potentially match with the vacancy. The constant returns to scale matching function ensures
this. This high marginal beneﬁt implies that it will be optimal for the planner to create a high number
7of vacancies. This action, however, will increase the number of matches, causing the unemployment
rate to be lower in the next period. This lower level of unemployment maps onto a reduced marginal
beneﬁt of posting a vacancy, as there are fewer job seekers available to match with the vacancy. Since
the cost of creating vacancies is a constant, the implication of this lower marginal beneﬁt to vacancy
posting is that the optimal number of new vacancies must be reduced. This will then bring down the
number of matches, causing higher unemployment in the following period.
3.2 Li-Yorke route
We now investigate the possibility for the time-map g to exhibit complex dynamics, i.e., periodic,
aperiodic, and chaotic behavior. The strategy will be to write down a set of conditions under which
the Li-Yorke “overshooting” inequalities hold. We start by restating the Li-Yorke theorem (as stated
in Benhabib and Day, 1981).
Theorem 1 Li-Yorke (1975) Let J be an interval in < and θt+1 = g(θt) be a diﬀerence equation in
which g is a continuous mapping of J → J. Suppose there exists a point θ ∈ J such that
g3(θ) ≤ θ<g (θ) <g 2(θ). (11)
Then,
a) for every k =1 ,2,3,....there is a k− periodic solution of θt+1 = g(θt) in J; and
b) there is an uncountable set S ∈ J, which contains no periodic points, such that for every initial
condition in S, the solution of θt+1 = g(θt) is aperiodic, and remains in S.
Below, we write down general conditions on parameters under which these Li-Yorke inequalities are
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Then the condition (11) of the Li-Yorke Theorem is satisﬁed.
8The set of three conditions constitute merely a set of suﬃcient conditions. A quick look at condition
(11) of the Li-Yorke Theorem suggests that a natural choice for the ﬁrst iterate of θ, i.e., g(θ) is θmax.
This is because it is known that if θ is deﬁned such that g(θ)=θmax, then 0 <θ<g (θ) <g 2(θ) will
always hold as long as (10) and (12) are satisﬁed. Then all that would remain would be to compare
g3 (θ) with θ. Assumption (13) corresponds to g2(θmax) <θ max, which for unimodal maps is a necessary
condition for chaos and hence is an assumption which always has to be made in some form whichever
route is chosen to prove the existence of chaos; see Mitra (2001) for further details. Assumption (13)
turns out to be especially useful for us because we have chosen θ such that g(θ)=θmax. In that case,
Assumption (13) simply states that g3 (θ) <g (θ). This last condition is clearly necessary, but not
suﬃcient, to show that g3 (θ) <θ .In our case, even if it were straightforward to compute g3 (θ), it
is not possible to directly compare it with θ, as the equation g(θ)=θmax does not have an explicit
solution. This is why condition (14) required. In Appendix B, we prove that this ﬁnal condition ensures
that g3 (θ) <θholds.
While these conditions appear somewhat complicated, they are simple to numerically verify for any
given set of parameters. We now provide slightly simpler conditions in the special case of θmax =1 .
This does greatly simplify the calculations, but the ﬁnal conditions are still non-trivially daunting.
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< 1 − a(1 − α)γ.
Then condition (11) of the Li-Yorke Theorem is satisﬁed.
We now proceed to provide an example of a set of parameters that satisfy the conditions of the
Li-Yorke inequalities as stated in (11).
Example 2 The set of parameters 8 A α β s γ
0.2536636 0.2251169 0.99 0.004390207 7.610282
are as-
sociated with θα
max =1 .487710 implying that condition (12) is satisﬁed, the left hand side of (13) is
8These correspond to a =0 .9856537,b=0 .05653293, and d =1 .480915.
90.001971010 <θ α
max =1 .48771, implying that condition (13) is satisﬁed, and the left and right hand
sides of (14) are −0.004851456 and 0.431773 × 10−14 respectively, implying that the ﬁnal condition of
Theorem (2), (14), is satisﬁed.
Remarks: A few remarks about the realism of these numbers is in order. To begin with, A is just
a scale variable; Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and many others, use A ≈ 0.4. The use of β =0 .99 is
standard in the literature and follows Garibaldi and Wasmer (2001) who report using s =0 .02, while
Fonseca and Muñoz (1999) and many others, depending on the frequency of the data used, use a smaller
number for s. Yashiv (2000) reports that the mean value of c lies between 12-22% of average match
output while our choice of γ is consistent with c near 13% of match output (net of leisure). Yashiv
(2000) suggests that, at least during 1975-79, estimates of α for the United States ranged between 0.2-
0.25, even though it was somewhat higher during other periods. Van Ours (1995) reports, using annual
Dutch data, that α is near 0.27. Mumford and Smith (1999) using Australian gross ﬂows data report
estimates of α near 0.28 while Anderson and Burgess (2001) ﬁnd it to be also near 0.3 using annual
(panel) U.S data. While some of the reported estimates of α in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) are
quite a bit higher than ours, there are some estimates, like the one using Israeli data which place α near
0.29, the one using English and Wales data that report an α near 0.3, and even one using Spanish data
that ﬁnd α to be near 0.12. It is well-known that these estimates of α depend crucially on the frequency
of the data, whether search intensity is modeled, on the deﬁnitions of the terms “unemployed” and “job
seekers” among other factors (see Mumford and Smith (1999) for details).9
3.3 Three-Period Cycles
As is well-known, a suﬃcient condition for chaotic behavior is the existence of a three-period cycle, i.e.,
the existence of a point θ, diﬀerent from the steady state, satisfying θ = g3(θ). This follows from the
fact that a three-period cycle satisﬁes (11) of the Li-Yorke Theorem with the ﬁrst ” ≤ ” holding with
equality. One simple way of providing a graphical representation of three-period cycles is to graph g3.
The map g3 will naturally cross the 45-degree line at the steady state. In addition each three-period
cycle will generate three additional intersections, as each of the points in the three-period cycle, by
deﬁnition, is a ﬁxed point of the function g3.10 Below, we present two examples of three-period cycles.
9Recall that suﬃciently high values of α make the map g(.) a monotonic function of θ, thereby ruling out the possibility
of any kind of cyclical behavior. It is however possible to generate two-period cycles using a value of α ≈ 0.45. Speciﬁcally,
set a = 0.990, b = 0.656, d = 1.19, and α = 0.454. This corresponds to s = 0.000158, A = 1.46, β =0 .99, and γ = 1.52.
Then θ cycles between 1.82 and 1.79. Similar high even-period cycles are easy to generate with α>0.4.
10See Devaney (1986, Fig 13.1) for additional information on this type of graphical depiction.
10Example 3 Let the set of parameters be deﬁned by A =7 .629,α=0 .1241,s=0 .055, and γ =0 .06. The
g locus in this case has the shape illustrated in Figure 1. There is a unique steady state θss =0 .367, and
g0(θss)=−2.21, indicating that θss is locally unstable in the backward dynamics and stable in the normal
forward dynamics. There is a 3-cycle that starts from 0.0009965, goes to 0.1625529 to 0.9704193, and
returns to 0.0009963. 11
Figures 2 and 3 below provide graphical representations of this cycle.








Figure 2: The map g(.) for Example 3
11The deeper parameters correspond to a =0 .9348154,b=0 .9377004, and d =0 .4026384. Lorenz (1993, Appendix
A.4) discusses how the “standard ﬂoating-point arithmetic” on computers that considers only a ﬁnite number of digits
and truncates the rest is responsible for the divergence in the last (seventh) digit of the starting and ending point of the
three-cycle in Example 3.
11 











Figure 3: The map g3(.) in Example 3
Notice the intersections of the g3(.) locus with the 450 line; one of these corresponds to the stationary
solution θss =0 .367, while the other intersections (points a,b, and c) correspond to points on a three-
cycle outlined in Example 3 respectively.








Figure 4: The map of g(.) against θ for Example 3
We conclude this sub-section by presenting another example of a three-period cycle, one using a more
“realistic” value of α.
12Example 4 Let the set of parameters be deﬁned by
A α β s γ
0.333 0.2430 0.99 0.013 6.623
. For this
conﬁguration, there is a unique steady state θss =2 0 .02, and g0(θss)=−2.21, indicating that θss is
locally unstable in the backward dynamics and stable in the normal forward dynamics. There is a
3-cycle in θ that starts from 0.00000015, goes to 8.509655 to 52.20478 and returns to 0.00000015.
3.4 When three-period cycles are ruled out
It is possible that depending on thec h o i c eo fp a r a m e t e r s ,t h em a pg may not admit a three-period
cycle. Is it still possible to show the existence of chaotic planning solutions in this case? Mitra (2001)
oﬀers a suﬃcient condition for chaos in unimodal maps (like g) which do not admit three-period cycles.
In this section we will verify that this model may display topological chaos, even for combinations of
parameters which rule out three-period cycles.
Mitra (2001) focuses solely on dynamical systems (X,g), where the state space X is an interval on
the non-negative part of the real line. The map, g, is required to be a continuous function from X to
X, unimodal with a maximum at θmax with g(θmax) >θ max, and the unique steady state (θss) must
satisfy θss >θ max. For such maps, Mitra (2001) states the following theorem (his Proposition 2.3, p.
142) which we restate for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 3 (Mitra, 2001) Let (X,g) be a dynamical system. If g satisﬁes g2 (θmax) <θ max and
g3 (θmax) <θ ss, then (X,g) exhibits topological chaos.
It is well-known that g2 (θmax) <θ max (corresponding to our condition (13)) is necessary for chaos
(see Mitra, 2001). Below we present a parametric speciﬁcation for which the dynamical system g does
not admit any three-period cycles, and yet, the Mitra condition is satisﬁed.
Example 5 Let the set of parameters be deﬁned by
A α β s γ
0.484 0.2414 0.99 0.004 3.445
.A si se v -
ident from Figure 5 [ap l o to fg3(.)], the map g does not admit three-period cycles. It is easy to check
that θss =1 0 .6,θ max =2 .58,g 2 (θmax)=0 .28 and g3 (θmax)=8 .26 implying that the Mitra condition
for topological chaos is satisﬁed.










Figure 5: The map g3(.) for Example 5
Remarks: Using the new Mitra condition, we have thus veriﬁed that even for ranges of parameters
where the Li-Yorke and three-period cycles routes to chaos cannot be taken, our map g may still exhibit
topological chaos. In passing, it is useful to point out that neither the Mitra condition nor the Li-Yorke
“overshooting” condition are necessary for the existence of topological chaos. In other words, for the
map g, there may exist ranges of parameters for which we are not able to determine whether chaos is a
possibility.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper takes the planning solution to the standard Pissarides (1990, 2001) “textbook model” of
search and matching in labor markets, and shows that chaotic behavior may emerge in that frame-
work. We show that the planning solution is completely characterized by a ﬁrst-order, non-linear scalar
diﬀerence equation. There is a unique stationary solution. Additionally, there are a large number of
periodic and even aperiodic dynamical solutions that may exist. Unlike assumptions made in some
recent work in this literature investigating the market solution, we do not require the production nor
the matching technologies to exhibit any increasing returns. We go on to check the robustness of our
claim of topological chaos by verifying the new suﬃcient condition due to Mitra (2001) in addition to
the more standard Li-Yorke three-period cycle condition.
14Appendix
A Derivation of Equation (5)
From (3), we obtain the following expression for λt :
λt =
βtc
q0 (θt)θt + q(θt)
(A1)
Using (A1) for period t and period t +1 , we can insert this expression into (4):
−
βtc
q0 (θt)θt + q(θt)
+ βt+1 (y − z)+
βt+1c
q0 (θt+1)θt+1 + q(θt+1)
£




Inserting the expressions for q(θ) and q0 (θ) (recall that q(θ)=Aθ−α) and re-arranging, we get:















From here, straightforward manipulation yields
(1 − s)βθα
t+1 − αAβθt+1 = θα
t −
(1 − α)Aβ (y − z)
c
,
which immediately provides the desired expression in (5).¥
B Proof of Theorem 2
To prove the theorem, we need to verify that there exists a point where the “overshooting” inequality
of the Li-Yorke Theorem, equation (11), is satisﬁed. Speciﬁcally, we need to show that there exists a
set of four points θ1,θ 2,θ 3, and θ4, where the variables are deﬁned as θ2 ≡ g(θ1),θ 3 ≡ g(θ2), and
θ4 ≡ g(θ3), and where the four points satisfy θ4 ≤ θ1 <θ 2 <θ 3. We intend to do this by showing that




1−α . Speciﬁcally, we will show
that if conditions (12), (13), and (14) hold, then the Li-Yorke conditions are satisﬁed for the points
where θ1 is implicitly deﬁned by the equation g (θ1)=θmax,θ 2 is chosen to be θmax,θ 3 = g (θmax) and
θ4 = g2 (θmax). To ensure that the steady state is to the right of the maximum, we have already made
the assumption that g(θmax) >θ max, which is equivalent to assuming θ2 <θ 3. Similarly it is obvious
that since g (θ2) l i e sa b o v et h e4 5 - d e g r e el i n ea n dg is unimodal, then if θ1 is well-deﬁned, it must be less
than θ2. To complete the proof we thus need to ensure that the equation g (θ1)=θmax has a solution
with θ1 > 0 and we need to verify that θ4 ≤ θ1.
F i r s tw ew i l lc h e c kt h a tg (θ1)=θmax does indeed have a solution. The equation can be conveniently
formulated as
axα




1−α − d (15)
Note that the left-hand side of (15) is a function of θ1, while the right-hand side is a constant. Deﬁne
f (x)=axα − bx. To ensure that this equation has a solution, and provides a value θ1 > 0,l e tu s
15examine the properties of f. It is simple to establish that f obtains it maximum at θmax. First calculate
the ﬁr s td e r i v a t i v ea n ds e ti te q u a lt o0 :











Checking the second derivative f00 (x)=αa(α − 1)xα−2 < 0 veriﬁes that the left-hand side of (15) is a
concave function with a unique maximum at θmax = θ2. Thus, to ensure that the equation indeed has




1−α − d. Rewriting this condition, simple





1−α [1 − a + aα].
This exactly corresponds to (10) which was made to ensure that the steady state occurred to the right
of the maximum.
Now that the existence of θ1 is veriﬁed, we need to check that θ1 is positive. Note that f (0) = 0,
so θ1 will be positive as long as the constant on the right hand side of (15) is greater than 0. Thus, to






This condition corresponds exactly to (12) and θ1 > 0 is ensured. Note that since α,a < 1, the upper
bound on d imposed by (12) is indeed greater than the lower bound provided by (10). We have thus
satisﬁed ourselves that θ1 is well-deﬁned and greater than zero, and we can move on to the last part of
the proof.
All that remains now is to show that θ4 ≤ θ1. To this end, deﬁne Γ(x) ≡ g (x)




1−α , such that θ1 is implicitly deﬁned by the equation Γ(θ1)=0 . Note that Γ is strictly concave
and attains its maximum at θ2. This implies that Γ(x) is strictly increasing for x<θ 2. Therefore we
know that if θ4 is less than θ2, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for θ4 <θ 1 is Γ(θ4) ≤ Γ(θ1)=0 .
Before proceeding it is worth noting that θ4 ≤ θ2 is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for θ4 ≤ θ1,
since we have already established that θ1 <θ 2. The rest of the proof will therefore proceed in two steps,
the ﬁrst is to verify that θ4 <θ 2, and the second is to show that Γ(θ4) ≤ 0.
To verify that θ4 <θ 2, we will need to ﬁnd the precise expression for θ4. Recall that by deﬁnition,
θ4 = g2 (θmax)=g (θ3). Now since θ3 = g (θmax), we can calculate θ3 directly as
θ3 = g (θ2)=( aθα
max − bθmax + d)
1
α .




max − bθmax + d) − b(aθα





The necessary condition θ4 <θ 2 = θmax can then be written as
³
a(aθα
max − bθmax + d) − b(aθα




α = θmax ⇔
a(aθα
max − bθmax + d) − b(aθα
max − bθmax + d)
1
α + d<θ α
max.
This corresponds exactly to the condition (13) in the theorem, and we have therefore established that
θ4 <θ 2. Recall that when θ4 <θ 2, Γ(θ4) ≤ 0 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for θ4 ≤ θ1, so all
16that remains to be shown now is that Γ(θ4) ≤ 0. By the deﬁnition of Γ, this inequality can be written
as
axα









max − bθmax + d) − b(aθα







max − bθmax + d) − b(aθα














max − a2bθmax − ab(aθα








max − abθmax +( 1+a)d − b(aθα





which exactly corresponds to the condition (14) in the theorem. We have thus established that θ4 ≤ θ1
and the proof is complete.¥
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